In summary, the Oslo Accords introduced an expected counterpart to the issue, which could be called “country and economy in exchange for security”. The dissolution of the Oslo process began with the feeling that the counterparty was not implemented as planned. The controversies surrounded Oslo from the moment it illuminated the light of the world. Two articles were published in the October 21, 1993 edition of the London Review of Books; Edward Said did the trial in the first. He called the agreement “an instrument of Palestinian capitulation, a Palestinian Versailles” and argued that he called international legality a violation of the fundamental national rights of the Palestinian people. It could not advance true Palestinian self-determination, because it meant freedom, sovereignty and equality, not a permanent submission to Israel. From the beginning, Oslo was conceived as a prelude to the difficult negotiations expected for a final agreement. An important element was that peace could be spread by the goodwill of the leaders of both peoples. At the Camp David Summit in 2000, the United States tried to salvage the agreements by relaunching the negotiations.

After the failure of the summit, the Second Intifada broke out and the “peace process” was deadlocked. (4) Both parties agree that the outcome of the sustainable status negotiations should not be compromised or anticipated by the agreements reached during the transition period. [1] Excluding Jerusalem and settlements from the territories to be transferred to the Palestinians would not change the Israeli presence, including the army to protect them, without a negotiated agreement. The agreements also preserve Israel`s exclusive control of the borders, airspace and territorial waters of the Gaza Strip. Oslo II, Article XII: The failure of the Oslo Accords can be attributed to the same reasons that normally cause most of the failures of agreements: both parties felt that Oslo had not provided what they expected of it. The economic dimensions of the agreements were also examined by Peter Lagerquist in “Privatizing the Occupation: The Political Economy of an Oslo Development Project” and Leila Farsakh in “Undermining Democracy in Palestine: The Politics of International Aid Since Oslo”. While Lagerq investigates the “questionable economic and financial plans” that the Oslo Accords have allowed Israeli and Palestinian elites, Farsakh observes that donor countries are implementing programmes in Palestine, in complete disregard of the reality on the ground. In his critical assessment of aid programmes in Palestine under the auspices of Oslo, Farsakh asserts that “the donor community has not accepted Palestinian society`s own criticism of the Oslo process and its definition of resistance to occupation.” The donor countries, led by the European Union and the United States, have instead focused on the policy of normalization with Israel against the national aspirations of the Palestinians themselves. While Peres, at the request of U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, had only limited settlement construction,[24] Mr. Netanyahu continued his construction in existing Israeli settlements[25] and presented plans for the construction of a new neighborhood, Har Homa, in East Jerusalem.

But it remained well below the level of the Shamir government from 1991 to 1992 and gave up on building new settlements, although the Oslo Accords did not provide for such a ban. [24] Construction of housing units before Oslo: 1991-92: 13,960, After Oslo: 1994-95: 3,840, 1996-1997: 3,570. [26] In May 1999, the five-year transition period ended without a comprehensive peace agreement, but the elements of the Oslo Accords remained.